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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Defendant disagrees with the Plaintiff's statement of the 
Standard of Review. 
The Defendant suggests that the essence of any cause of action 
involves the violation of a "primary right" on which a "duty" of 
the Defendant rests. The "primary right" and "duty" constitute the 
cause of action. Here the "primary right" that the Plaintiff 
alleges was violated is his right of visitation, or the Right of 
Filial Consortium. 
The Right of "Filial Consortium" is not recognized in Utah as 
a tort. The Plaintiff cites no Utah authority for recognition of 
that right, or of that duty or cause of action. 
Contrary, the Defendant directs attention to In re Marriage of 
Secrel 224 C.R. 591 (1986) ; Surina v. Lucev 214 C.R. 509 (1985) and 
Borer v. American Airlines 13 8 C.R. 3 02 (1977) as support from a 
sister state that interference with visitation is not actionable in 
tort, and that no sister state has recognized the tort of Filial 
Consortium. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff suggests in his brief that one of the issues on 
review is this case is the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. The trial court specifically found no cause of 
action had been pled in the complaint for that tort. The Plaintiff 
has not argued in his brief or otherwise, or even cited as error, 
that there were facts pled to justify a cause of action for 
emotional distress or that the trial court was wrong. That issue 
is simply not on appeal! 
The only issue presented for appeal is, if a cause of action 
exists in tort for intentional interference with Plaintiff's 
visitation rights, separate and apart from existing legislation. 
However, in making such a request, the Plaintiff is in reality 
forcing this court to: 
1. Judicially recognize a new tort of filial consortium; 
2. Establish some kind of standard for awarding damages for 
a completely intangible injury; 
3. Specifically rule that the legislature in Section 30-3-5, 
3 0-3-11.1, and 3 0-3-16.1 Utah Code does not control, regulate and 
supervise the care, custody and financial relationships between 
parents and children; and that the best interests of the children 
will be served in creating the new tort; and 
4. To recognize the peripheral problems associated with 
recognition of the new tort of filial consortium and how they will 
be handled in actions not presented in spousal context; i.e., where 
a third party negligently injures both parents and children. How 
will the court evaluate intangible injuries in multiple claims 
action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff's Statement of the case is accurate except for 
the last paragraph thereof. 
There never has been a finding, not even allegations in the 
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complaint, that the Defendant has "continually frustrated, 
interfered and denied Plaintiff his visitation." Such is not in 
any record on appeal herein, and is not a fact pled or at issue in 
this proceeding. 
The Plaintiff has not urged nor cited as an issue of error 
that the complaint was sufficient to state a cause of action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, the only 
issue on appeal is whether a parent can sue in tort for interfering 
with visitation, bypassing existing legislation provided in Section 
3 0-3-5, which establishes an exclusive remedy to deal with 
visitation problems between parents. 
The Plaintiff is seeking to have this court establish new law, 
create a new cause of action in tort, for interference with 
visitation. 
The Plaintiff argues it is not creating "new law", but only 
applying well recognized law of emotional distress to a different 
body of law. 
The trial court found the complaint did not allege a cause of 
action for emotional distress and the Plaintiff has not argued 
otherwise; but in the same breath the Plaintiff seems to indicate 
a new cause of action arising out of emotional distress by finding 
that a violation of visitation creates a tort of infliction of 
emotional distress. 
Since the issue of emotional distress was not pleaded nor 
suggested to be error by the trial court, one wonders how emotional 
distress now suddenly becomes the sole basis of the only cause of 
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action on which Plaintiff is relying for this appeal. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Plaintiff father suggests that there are facts which 
suggest that he has been "routinely and consistently denied 
visitation by the Defendant mother." There are no such findings by 
any court of those facts. Further, the complaint in this matter 
does not even allege such facts and nothing in the record on appeal 
suggests such facts. 
Instead, this case involves a mother and father who have been 
in and out of court numerous times litigating issues of non-payment 
of child support, modification of the divorce decree and contempt 
for non-payment of child support. Specifically on January 23, 
1992, the Plaintiff was incarcerated in the Salt Lake County Jail 
for contempt, for non-payment of child support. 
It is agreed that the Plaintiff did file a complaint case 
number 92093961CV in this court with one cause of action that is 
founded solely on "interference with the right of visitation." The 
court in its bench ruling stated, "The complaint does not allege a 
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress". 
Lastly, the Plaintiff suggests that the action was commenced 
"only after traditional remedies proved ineffective." There is no 
such finding by any court, nor is such alleged in the complaint in 
this matter. Such a suggestions is inappropriate and is not part 
of the record on appeal. 
4 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
It is true that this matter was dismissed after Defendant 
filed a motion to dismiss. Defendant suggests that this court 
review the order and bench ruling as to the basis of the trial 
court's dismissal. However, it is essentially as follows: 
1) The complaint does not state a cause of action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
2) This court may not legislate or create a new cause of 
action, when the legislature has already provided exclusive 
remedies dealing with violation of court order visitation. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the basis: first, 
Plaintiff failed to plead a cause of action for emotional distress; 
and second, because there was no case law to support a new tort 
cause of action for interference with visitation rights. 
The Plaintiff has not argued as error that he did plead a 
cause of action for emotional distress, nor did the Plaintiff 
appeal on those grounds or cite as an issue on appeal that he did 
properly plead a cause of action for emotional distress. That 
issue is not before this court. 
The only issue that is before this court is whether this court 
should recognize a new tort of filial consortium that has not been 
recognized in any jurisdiction in these United States. 
The Plaintiff would have this court believe that there is a 
widespread movement adopting a new tort of intentional infliction 
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of emotional distress and intentional interference with court 
ordered child visitation. Neither is the case. 
The John Marshall Law Review article from which Plaintiff has 
taken all of his supporting cases deals mostly with Federal child 
napping cases and none really address the only issue presented by 
Plaintiff; i.e., establishing a new tort of filial consortium. 
Sheltra v. Smith 392 A2d 431 cited by Plaintiff is the only case 
that is applicable to this action. It is an action founded on 
emotional distress. However, the Plaintiff here has not pled such 
a cause of action and the case is inappropriate as a reference. 
California has recognized the problems of judicial legislation 
and of adopting a new cause of action of Filial Consortium as have 
other states. None has recognized the tort. Judicial recognition 
of loss of consortium has always been narrowly circumscribed. It 
is an intangible injury for which money does not and cannot 
compensate. Not every loss can be made compensable in money. 
Legal causation must exist and it is the duty of the courts to 
locate the line of liability and the line which is essentially 
political, remembering that it is not the duty of the courts to 
legislate. 
Lastly, to recognize the new right and duty proposed by 
Plaintiff would only undermine the purpose of the Family Law Act 
which is designed to regulate and supervise the care, custody and 
financial support of minor children. 
Neither the Plaintiff nor the author of the John Marshall Law 
Review article have addressed these issues and problems, preferring 
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to avoid them and suggest that the new wave of the future is to 
simply adopt a new tort law, broad brushing the issues without 
facts claiming without substantiation that the "traditional 
remedies are ' ineffective'!l. 
DETAILED ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT I 
THE TORT OF FILIAL CONSORTIUM DOES NOT EXIST IN UTAH 
The only right the Plaintiff seeks in this action to enforce 
by way of tort is his right of child visitation, or the right of 
Filial Consortium. 
The Plaintiff has cited no case law to support the existence 
of that cause of action in Utah or in any other jurisdiction of any 
sister state. 
In California the court in Foy v. Greenblott (1983) 190 C.R. 
84 stated: 
The right of filial consortium has not been recognized 
as a basis for a cause of action in California. 
In In Re Marriage of Segel (1986) 224 C.R. 591 the court there, 
faced with an identical fact situation that exists in the instant 
action, held: 
The judicial recognition of a cause of action for loss of 
filial consortium would undermine the purpose of the 
Family Law Act which is designed, among other things, to 
regulate and supervise the care, custody and financial 
support of minor children whose parents are the subjects 
of dissolution proceedings. 
The court in Segel cited additional policy reasons for not finding 
a valid new cause of action of Filial Consortium including: 
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1. Loss of consortium should be narrowly circumscribed, and 
such an action would not be within the bounds; 
2. Cost of attempting to compensate for loss of society of 
parent and child cannot be justified the social cost of the 
tort ; 
3. Party must seek redress under Family Law Act; 
4. Public policy would be best served by not awarding damages 
in situations where a claim is between parent and child. 
Here the Plaintiff is asking this court, with no authority 
whatsoever, to recognize the tort of Filial Consortium. No other 
jurisdiction recognizes that right. The policy of judicial 
legislation is set forth in 64 Harvard Law Review 1188: 
Judicial opinions abound in declarations to the effect 
that a reviewing court must follow the law, and that 
the policy, wisdom or justice of the law is for the 
legislature and not the courts to determine. 
If that right is to be recognized, it should be the 
responsibility of the legislature and not this court. 
ARGUMENT II 
NO ACTION FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS HAS BEEN PLED OR APPEALED 
As previously stated the trial court found that no cause of 
action for emotional distress had been pled nor was an appeal taken 
from that ruling. The Plaintiff cannot now seek to argue emotional 
distress as the basis of any claim as he does in his arguments I 
and II. They are simply not before the court. 
Plaintiff's complaint only states that the Defendant 
intentionally and effectively interfered with visitation. Even by 
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the standards of Plaintiff's own authority, note 111 of the John 
Marshall Law Review article, emotional distress has only been found 
where one party's conduct has been so outrageous in character and 
so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bound of decency, 
with citations. Such was not pled. 
ARGUMENT III 
NO TORT CAUSE OF ACTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS EXISTS IN UTAH 
FOR INTERFERENCE WITH VISITATION BY A PARENT 
All cases cited by Plaintiff that urge adoption of a new cause 
of action for emotional distress deal with physical abduction from 
a parent having lawful custody. The sole exception is Sheltra v. 
Smith, supra, but there the court stated a prima facia case must 
include: 
1. Outrageous conduct; 
2. Acts done intentionally or with reckless disregard; 
3. Severe emotional distress to Plaintiff; 
4. Defendant's conduct must be proximate case of injury. 
All other state courts have refused to recognize the tort for the 
reasons set forth in Argument I of the Defendant. Moreover, the 
only other authority cited by Plaintiff is scattered lower federal 
district court rulings. It is well recognized that: 
Where lower federal court precedents are divided or 
lacking, state courts must necessarily make an 
independent determination of federal law. 
Rohr v. San Diego (1959) 51 C2d 759; 336 P2d 521 
The Defendant believes that Utah has already established 
family law statutes to deal with disputes raised by the Plaintiff; 
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and that this court, by recognizing this tort, would be undermining 
the Family Law Act and essentially be conducting judicial 
legislation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff suggests that "the trend" of national modern law 
is to support recognition of the tort of emotional distress from 
interfering with court ordered visitation. He offers no facts to 
support that position. Even the John Marshall Law Review article 
on page 312 indicates that different states are attempting to find 
alternate ways to deal with parental visitation. 
There is a trend among several jurisdictions to relax 
custody modification standards as a means to solve the 
problem of parental interference with visitation. 
Further, there is no issue before this court dealing with 
emotional distress as it was not pled nor cited as error, nor 
appealed. 
Thus, the Plaintiff seeks only that this court recognize a new 
tort of Filial Consortium, providing no authority or basis under 
which this court may act. 
This appeal must be denied and the Defendant awarded legal 
fees and costs in defending a frivolous appeal. 
Date J ' j r ^ l 
RICHARD S. NEMELKA 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
^T^/ 
10 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this the /,) day of J k, ^ , 
1993 I duly personally hand delivered Two (2) copies of the 
foregoing Appellee's Brief to counsel for the Plaintiff at his 
office address as follows; 
GEORGE H. SEARLE 
2805 South State St. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115 
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HUSBAND AND WIFE 30-3-16.3 
30-3-13.1. Establishment of family court divi-
sion of district court 
A family court division of the district court may be 
established with the consent of the county commis-
sion in a county in which the district court deter-
mines that the social conditions in the county and the 
number of domestic relations cases in the courts re-
quire use of the procedures provided for in this act in 
order to give full and proper consideration to such 
cases and to effectuate the purposes of this act. The 
determination shall be made annually by the judge of 
the district court in counties having only one judge, 
and by a majority of the judges of the district court in 
counties having more than one judge. 1969 
30-3-14. Repealed. 1961 
30-3-14.1. Designation of judges — Terms. 
In a county within a judicial district having more 
than one judge of the district court but having a popu-
lation of less than 300,000 and in which the district 
court has established a family court division, the pre-
siding judge of such court shall annually, in the 
month of September, designate at least one judge to 
hear all cases under this act. In a county within a 
judicial district having more than one judge of the 
district court and having a population of more than 
300,000 and in which the district court has estab-
lished a family court division, the presiding judge of 
such court shall annually, in the month of September, 
designate at least two judges to hear all cases under 
this act, and shall designate one of such judges as the 
presiding judge of such family court division. Such 
judge or judges shall serve on the family court divi-
sion not less than one year and devote their time 
primarily to divorce and other domestic relations 
cases. 1969 
30-3-15. Repealed. 1961 
30-3-15.1. Appointment of domestic relations 
counselors, family court commis-
sioner, and assistants and clerks. 
In each county having a population of less than 
300,000 and in which the district court has estab-
lished a family court division the district court judge 
or judges may, and in each county having a popula-
tion of more than 300,000 and in which the district 
court has established a family court division the dis-
trict court judges shall, by an order filed in the office 
of the clerk on or before July 1 of each year, appoint 
one or more domestic relations counselors, an attor-
ney of recognized ability and standing at the bar as 
femily court commissioner, and such other persons as 
assistants and clerks as may be necessary, to serve 
during the pleasure of the appointing power. 1969 
3 0
^-15.2 . Repea led . 1992 
3
^"3-15.3. Commiss ioners — P o w e r s . 
Commissioners shal l : 
(1) secure compliance with court orders; 
(2) require completion of mandatory mediation 
as provided in Sections 30-3-21 and 30-3-24; 
j (3) require attendance at the mandatory 
course as provided in Section 30-3-11.3; 
(4) serve as judge pro tempore, master or ref-
1 e
**ee on: 
(a) assignment of the court; and 
(b) with the wri t ten consent of the part ies: 
(i) orders to show cause where no con-
tempt is alleged; 
(ii) default divorces where the par t ies 
have had marr iage counseling but there 
h a s been no reconciliation; 
(iii) uncontested actions under the 
Uniform Act on Paternity; 
(iv) actions under the Uniform Civil 
Liability for Support Act; and 
' (v) actions under the Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act; and 
(5) represent the interest of children in divorce 
or annu lment actions, and the part ies in appro-
priate cases. 1992 
30-3-15.4. Salaries and expenses . 
Salaries of persons appointed under the foregoing 
sections shall be fixed by the board of commissioners 
of the county in which they serve. Office space, fur-
nishings, equipment and supplies for family court 
commissioners and conciliation staff shall be pro-
vided by the board of county commissioners. The ex-
penses and salaries of family court commissioners 
and conciliation staff shall be paid from county funds 
under Section 17-16-7. 1969 
30-3-16. Repealed . i96i 
30-3-16.1. Jurisdiction of family court division 
— Powers. 
Whenever any controversy exists between spouses 
which mav. unless a reconciliation is acnieved. result 
in the dissolution or annulment of the marriage or in 
the disruption of the household, and there is a child of 
the spouses nr eithpr nf thpm iinrter the flffe of 17 
years whose welfare might be affected, the family 
court division of the district court shall have jurisdic-
tion over the controversy, over the part ies and over 
all persons having any relation to the controversy 
and may compel at tendance before the court or a do-
mestic relations counselor of the parties or other per-
sons related to the controversy. The court may make 
orders in divorce or conciliation proceeding as it 
deems necessary for the protection of the family in-
terests. 1969 
30-3-16.2. Pet i t ion for concil iation. 
Prior to the filing of any action for divorce, annul-
ment, or separate maintenance, either spouse or both 
spouses may file a petition for conciliation in the fam-
ily court division invoking the jurisdiction of the 
court for the purpose of preserving the marr iage by 
effecting a reconciliation between the par t ies or an 
amicable set t lement of the controversy between them 
so as to avoid litigation over the issues involved. 1969 
30-3-16.3. Contents of petition. 
The petition for conciliation shall s tate: 
(1) A controversy exists between the spouses 
and request the aid of the pourt to effect a recon-
ciliation or an amicable settlement of the contro-
versy. 
(2) The name and age of each child under the 
age of 17 years whose welfare may be affected by 
the controversy. 
(3) The name and address of the petitioner or 
the names and addresses of the petitioners. 
(4) If the petition is filed by one spouse, only, 
the name and address of the other spouse as a 
respondent. 
(5) The name, as a respondent, of any other 
person who has any relation to the controversy 
and, if known to the petitioners, the address of 
such person. 
30-3-10.6 HUSBAND AND WIFE 130 
maintenance, or alimony under this chapter or Title 
30, Chapter 4, provides a different time for payment, 
all monthly payments of support, maintenance, or ali-
mony provided for in the order or decree shall be due 
one-half by the 5th day of each month, and the re-
maining one-half by the 20th day of that month. 1985 
30-3-10.6. Payment under child support order 
— Judgment. 
(1) Each payment or installment of child or spousal 
support under any child support order, as defined by 
Subsection 62A-11-401(3), is, on and after the date it 
is due: 
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and 
effect of any judgment of a district court, except 
as provided in Subsection (2); 
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and 
credit in this and in any other jurisdiction; and 
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by 
this or any other jurisdiction, except as provided 
in Subsection (2). 
(2) A child or spousal support payment under a 
child support order may be modified with respect to 
any period during which a petition for modification is 
pending, but only from the date notice of that petition 
was given to the obligee, if the obligor is the peti-
tioner, or to the obligor, if the obligee is the peti-
tioner. 
(3) For purposes of this section, "jurisdiction" 
means a state or political subdivision, a territory or 
possession of the United States, the District of Co-
lumbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(4) The judgment provided for in Subsection (l)(a), 
to be effective and enforceable as a lien agains t the 
real property interest of any third par ty relying on 
the public record, shall be docketed in the district 
court in accordance with Sections 78-22-1 and 
62A-11-311. 1989 
30-3-11. Repealed. 1961 
30-3-11.1. Family Court Act — Purpose. 
It is the public policy of the state nf Utah to 
strengthen the family life foundation of our society 
and reduce the social and economic costs to the state 
resulting from broken homes and to take reasonable 
measures to preserve marriages, particularly where 
minor children are involved. The purposes of this act 
are to protect the rights of children and to promote 
the public welfare by preserving and protecting fam-
ily life and the institution ot matrimony py providing 
the courts with further assistance for family counsel-
ing, the reconciliation of spouses and the amicable 
settlement of domestic and family controversies! 1969 
30-3-11.2. Appointment of counsel for child. 
If, in any action before any court of this state in-
volving the custody or support of a child, it shall ap-
pear in the best interests of the child to have a sepa-
rate exposition of the issues and personal representa-
tion for the child, the court may appoint counsel to 
represent the child throughout the action, and the 
attorney's fee for such representation may be taxed as 
a cost of the action. 1969 
30-3-11.3. Mandatory educational course for di-
vorcing parents — Pilot program — 
Purpose — Curriculum — Exceptions. 
(1) There is established a mandatory course for di-
vorcing parents as a pilot program in the third and 
fourth judicial districts to be administered by the Ad-
ministrative Office of the Courts from July 1,1992, to 
March 1, 1994. The mandatory course is designed to 
educate and sensitize divorcing parties to their chil-
dren's needs both during and after the divorce pro-
cess. 
(2) The Judicial Council shall adopt rules to imple-
ment and administer this pilot program. 
(3) As used in this section, both parties to a divorce 
action who have a child or children and the plaintiff 
has filed an action in the judicial district as defined in 
Section 78-1-2.1 where the pilot program is adminis-
tered are governed by this section. As a prerequisite 
to receiving a divorce decree, both parties are re-
quired to attend a mandatory course on their chil-
dren's needs after filing a complaint for divorce and 
receiving a docket number unless waived under Sec-
tion 30-3-4. If waived, the court may permit the di-
vorce action to proceed. 
(4) The mandatory course shall instruct both par-
ties about divorce and its impacts on: 
(a) their child or children; 
(b) their family relationship; and 
(c) their financial responsibilities for their 
child or children. 
(5) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall 
administer the course pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 
56, Utah Procurement Code, through private or pub-
lic contracts and organize the pilot program in the 
third and fourth judicial districts as defined in Sec-
tion 78-1-2.1. 
(6) The certificate of completion shall constitute 
evidence to the court of course completion by the par-
ties. 
(7) (a) Each party shall pay the costs of the course 
to the independent contractor providing the 
course at the time and place of the course. 
(b) Each party who is unable to pay the costs of 
the course may attend the course without pay-
ment upon a prima facie showing of 
impecuniosity as evidenced by an affidavit of 
impecuniosity filed in the district court. In those 
situations, the independent contractor shall be 
reimbursed for its costs from the appropriation to 
the Administrative Office of the Courts to the 
"Mandatory Educational Course for Divorcing 
Parents Program." Before a decree of divorce 
shall be entered, the court shall make a final 
review and determination of impecuniosity and 
may order the payment of the costs if so deter-
mined. 
(8) Appropriations from the General Fund for the 
"Mandatory Educational Course for Divorcing Par-
ents Program" shall be used to pay for the costs for 
the indigent parent who makes a showing as provided 
in Subsection 30-3-11.3(7)(b). 
(9) The Administrat ive Office of the Courts shall 
adopt a program to evaluate t he effectiveness of the 
mandatory course. Progress reports shall be provided 
semi-annually on the date of implementa t ion of this 
section and on the resul ts beginning J a n u a r y 1,1993. 
The resul ts shall be reported to the Judic iary Inter im 
Committee on a bi-annual basis. 1992 
30-3-12. Courts to exercise family counseling 
powers. 
Each district court of the respective judicial dis-
tricts, while sitting in matters of divorce, annulment, 
separate maintenance, child custody, alimony and 
support in connection therewith, child custody in ha-
beas corpus proceedings, and adoptions, shall exercise 
the family counseling powers conferred by this act. 
1969 
30-3-13. Repea led . 1961 
127 HUSBAND AND WIFE 30-3-5 
(h) irreconcilable differences of the marriage; 
(i) incurable insanity; or 
(j) when the husband and wife have lived sepa-
rately under a decree of separate maintenance of 
any state for three consecutive years without co-
habitation. 
(4) A decree of divorce granted under Subsection 
(3)(j) does not affect the liability of either party under 
any provision for separate maintenance previously 
granted. 
(5) (a) A divorce may not be granted on the 
grounds of insanity unless: (i) the defendant has 
been adjudged insane by the appropriate authori-
ties of this or another state prior to the com-
mencement of the action; and (ii) the court finds 
by the testimony of competent witnesses that the 
insanity of the defendant is incurable. 
(b) The court shall appoint for the defendant a 
guardian ad litem, who shall protect the interests 
of the defendant. A copy of the summons and 
complaint shall be served on the defendant in 
person or by publication, as provided by the laws 
of this state in other actions for divorce, or upon 
his guardian ad litem, and upon the county attor-
ney for the county where the action is prosecuted. 
(c) The county attorney shall investigate the 
merits of the case and if the defendant resides out 
of this state, take depositions as necessary, at-
tend the proceedings, and make a defense as is 
just to protect the rights of the defendant and the 
interests of the state. 
(d) In all actions the court and judge have ju-
risdiction over the payment of alimony, the dis-
tribution of property, and the custody and main-
tenance of minor children, as the courts and 
judges possess in other actions for divorce. 
(e) The plaintiff or defendant may, if the de-
fendant resides in this state, upon notice, have 
the defendant brought into the court at trial, or 
have an examination of the defendant by two or 
more competent physicians, to determine the 
mental condition of the defendant. For this pur-
pose either party may have leave from the court 
to enter any asylum or institution where the de-
fendant may be confined. The costs of court in 
this action shall be apportioned by the court. 1987 
30-3-2. Right of husband to divorce. 
The husband may in all cases obtain a divorce from 
his wife for the same causes and in the same manner 
as the wife may obtain a divorce from her husband. 
1953 
30-3-3. Temporary alimony and suit money. 
The court may order either party to pay to the clerk 
a sum of money for the separate support and mainte-
nance of the adverse party and the children, and to 
enable such party to prosecute or defend the action. 
1953 
30-3-4.: Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Seal 
ing. 
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and] 
signed by the plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney. 
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted 
upon default or otherwise except upon legal evi-[ 
dence taken in the cause. 
*' (c) If the plaintiff and the defendant have a 
child or children and the plaintiff has filed an| 
action in the judicial district as defined in Sec 
tion 78-1-2.1 where the pilot program shall be 
administered, a decree of divorce may not be 
granted until both part ies have attended a man-j 
datory course provided in Section 30-3-11.3 and 
have presented a certificate of course completion 
to the court. The court may waive this require-
ment, on its own motion or on the motion of one 
of the parties, if it determines course at tendance 
and completion are not necessary, appropriate, 
feasible, or in the best interest of the parties, 
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be 
held before the court or the court commissioner 
as provided by Section 78-3-31 and rules of the 
Judicial Council. The court or the commissioner 
in all divorce cases shall make and file findings 
and decree upon the evidence. 
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be 
sealed by order of the court upon the motion of either 
party. The sealed portion of the file is available to the 
public only upon an order of the court. The concerned 
parties, the attorneys of record or attorney filing a 
notice of appearance in the action, the Office of Re-
covery Services if a party to the proceedings has ap-
plied for or is receiving public assistance, or the court 
have full access to the entire record. This sealing does 
not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend 
the decree. 1992 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repea l ed . 1990 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance 
and health care of parties and children 
— Division of debts — Court to have 
continuing jurisdiction — Custody and 
visitation — Termination of alimony — 
Nonmeritorious petition for modifica-
tion. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court 
may include in it equitable orders relating to the chil-
dren, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The 
court shall include the following in every decree of 
divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the 
payment of reasonable and necessary medical 
and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable 
cost, an order requiring the purchase and main-
tenance of appropriate health, hospital, and den-
tal care insurance for the dependent children; 
and 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is re-
sponsible for the payment of joint debts, obli-
gations, or liabilities of the parties con-
tracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify 
respective creditors or obligees, regarding 
the court's division of debts, obligations, or 
liabilities and regarding the parties' sepa-
rate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of 
-orders. _— — 
(2) The court may include, in* an order determining 
child support, an order assigning financial responsi-
bility for all or a portion of child care expenses in-
curred on behalf of the dependent children, necessi-
tated by the employment or training of the custodial 
parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent chil-
dren would be adequately cared for, it may include an 
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide the 
day care for the dependent children, necessitated by 
the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing iurjfiftirtmn fn malr* 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and 
30-3-5.1 HUSBAND 
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the chil-\ 
dren and their support, maintenance, health, and* 
dental care, or the distribution of the property and 
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, 
grandparents, and other relatives, the court shall 
consider the welfare of the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides 
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of thatformerspouse. However, 
if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab 
initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party 
paying alimony is made a party to the action of an-
nulment and his rights are determined. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony 
to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by 
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if 
it is further established by the person receiving ali-
mony that that relationship or association is without 
any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) When a petition for modification of child cus-
tody or visitation provisions of a court order is made 
and denied, the court may order the petitioner to pay 
the reasonable attorney's fees expended by the pre-
vailing party in tha t action, if the court determines 
that the petition was without merit and not asserted 
in good faith. 1991 
30-3-5.1. Provis ion for income withholding in 
child support order. 
Whenever a court enters an order for child support, 
it shall include in the order a provision for withhold-
ing income as a means of collecting child support as 
provided in Title 78, Chapter 45d. 1985 
30-3-5.2. Al legations of child abuse or child sex-
ual abuse — Investigation. 
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request 
for modification of a divorce decree, an allegation of 
child abuse or child sexual abuse is made, implicating 
either party, the court shall order tha t an investiga-
tion be conducted by the Division of Family Services 
within the Department of Human Services in accor-
dance with Title 62A, Chapter 4, Par t 5. A final 
award of custody or visitation may not be rendered 
until a report on tha t investigation is received by the 
court. That investigation shall be conducted by the 
Division of Family Services within 30 days of the 
court's notice and request for an investigation. In re-
viewing this report, the court shall comply with Sec-
tion 78-7-9. 1992 
30-3-5.5. Petition to protect abused child — Ju-
risdiction under this chapter. 
(1) A person who has filed a complaint under this 
chapter may also file a petition with the district court 
for a protective order for the protection of any chil-
dren residing with either party to the action under 
this chapter. The petition and procedures shall be the 
same as for the issuance of protective orders in the 
juvenile court under Sections 78-3a-20.5, 78-3a-20.6, 
78-3a-20.7, 78-3a-20.8, 78-3a-20.9, and 78-3a-20.10. 
The court or the cohabitant may use the protections 
provided in this chapter and Title 78, Chapter 3a, 
Juvenile Courts, and when necessary, those protec-
tions under Title 76, Chapter 5, Offenses Against the 
Person, which provide for criminal prosecution. 
(2) A person who has obtained a protective order 
pursuant to this section shall notify any other court 
in which another action is pending or order is issued 
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pertaining to the same family member named in the 
protective order. 1991 
30-3-6. Repealed. 1985 
30-3-7. When decree becomes absolute. 
I (1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute: 
(a) on the date it is signed by the court and 
I entered by the clerk in the register of actions if 
\ both the parties who have a child or children and 
the plaintiff has filed an action in the judicial 
district as defined in Section 78-1-2.1 where the 
I pilot program is administered and have com-
/ pleted attendance at the mandatory course pro-
vided in Section 30-3-11.3 except if the court 
waives the requirement, on its own motion or on 
the motion of one of the parties, upon determina-
tion that course attendance and completion are 
not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in the 
best interest of the parties; 
(b) at the expiration of a period of time the 
court may specifically designate, unless an ap-
peal or other proceedings for review are pending; 
or 
(c) when the court, before the decree becomes 
absolute, for sufficient cause otherwise orders. 
(2) The court, upon application or on its own mo-
tion for good cause shown, may waive, alter, or ex-
tend a designated period of t ime before the decree 
becomes absolute, but not to exceed six months from 
the signing and entry of the decree. 1992 
30-3-8. Remarriage — When unlawful. 
Neither party to a divorce proceeding which dis-
solves their marriage by decree may marry any per-
son other than the spouse from whom the divorce was 
granted until it becomes absolute. If an appeal is 
taken, the divorce is not absolute until after affir-
mance of the decree. 1988 
30-3-9. Repealed. 1969 
30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separa-
tion or divorce — Custody consider-
ation. 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children 
are separated, or their marriage is declared void or 
dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future 
care and custody of the minor children as it considers 
appropriate. In determining custody, the court shall 
consider the best interests of the child and the past 
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of 
the parties. The court may inquire of the children and 
take into consideration the children's desires regard-
ing the future custody, but the expressed desires are 
not controlling and the court may determine the chil-
dren's custody otherwise. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, 
among other factors the court finds relevant, which 
parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the 
child, including allowing the child frequent and con-
tinuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the 
court finds appropriate. 1988 
30-3-10.1. Joint legal custody defined. 
In this chapter, '^ joint legal custody": 
(1) means the sharing of the rights, privileges, 
duties, and powers of a parent by both parents, 
where specified; 
(2) may include an award of exclusive author-
ity by the court to one parent to make specific 
decisions; 
